AI Governance Compare

Platform responsibility compared — DSA/DMA vs China's algorithm provisions

graded per item, sources below·checked 2026-10-10

One question: what does the law make a platform responsible for? Short answer: the EU splits the job in two — content and risk in the DSA, competition in the DMA — and scales duties by size. China puts both into one procedural device: register the algorithm, publish how it works, let users switch it off, and answer for what it does.

Evidence grades (defined in 00-overview.md): A primary text, checked live; B other official source or a direct reading of the primary text; C our own comparison or inference, or not yet checked.

1. The table

Dimension EU China Grade
Instrument DSA (2022/2065) + DMA (2022/1925) Provisions on the Administration of Algorithmic Recommendations (Order No. 9) A
Applies from DSA: VLOPs 2023-08-25, all in-scope 2024-02-17. DMA: 2024-03-07 2022-03-01 A
Regulatory target intermediary services and platforms by size; separately, gatekeepers providers using recommendation technology, by algorithm type and public-opinion capacity A
Core device duties tiered by size; systemic-risk assessment for VLOPs filing with the regulator for services with public-opinion or social-mobilisation capacity, plus a security assessment; for anthropomorphic services, a fresh assessment owed to the provincial CAC at defined triggers, one of which is 1,000,000 registered or 100,000 monthly active users (Order No. 21, Art 22) A
Transparency recommender-system transparency (DSA Art 27) tell users recommendation is used; publish principles, purpose and main mechanism (Art 16) A
User control no direct opt-out duty in the DSA must offer a non-personalised option or an easy switch-off, effective immediately; tags must be selectable and deletable (Art 17) A
Minors no targeted ads to minors (DSA Art 28) age-appropriate modes; no algorithmic inducement into addiction (Art 18); and for anthropomorphic services, no virtual relatives or virtual partners to minors, guardian consent below 14, a minor mode with periodic reality reminders and time limits (Order No. 21, Art 14) A
Gatekeeping the app itself the DSA's device is notice-and-action after the fact; the DMA pushes the other way — gatekeepers must allow sideloading and alternative app stores app stores and distribution platforms must verify an anthropomorphic app's security assessment and filing before listing it, and must refuse, warn, suspend or delist where rules are breached (Order No. 21, Art 25) A
Competition the DMA's gatekeeper rules Art 15: no unreasonable restriction of other providers, no monopoly or unfair competition A
Price discrimination not a DSA core duty Art 21: no unreasonable differential treatment in price or terms A
Labour not addressed Art 20: scheduling algorithms must respect pay, rest and hours A
Enforcement style independent audits, risk assessments, researcher access; fines up to 6% (DSA), 10%/20% (DMA) filing number displayed; warnings and corrective orders; refusal or serious cases → suspend information updates + RMB 10,000–100,000 B

2. Six observations

  1. Filing versus auditing. China's hinge is a registration gate: file within 10 working days, get a number, display it. The EU's hinge is continuous obligation: risk assessments, audits, and complaint handling, with no register of algorithms. — B
  2. China writes user control into the statute. The duty to give an off-switch and tag-level control has no direct DSA equivalent — the EU approach is transparency plus risk management, not a mandated opt-out. — A
  3. The EU separates content from competition; China merges them. Article 15 of the Chinese provisions reaches conduct the EU would treat as DMA territory — but through a content-regulation instrument. — B
  4. China addresses users the EU largely does not. Labour scheduling algorithms, elderly-friendly services and price discrimination appear explicitly; the DSA/DMA framework mostly addresses business users and consumers in the abstract. — A
  5. Sanction scale differs sharply. DSA/DMA fines are turnover-based and can reach billions; the Chinese provisions top out at RMB 100,000 plus suspension of information updates — the operational sanction, not the fine, is the deterrent. — B
  6. China now regulates persuasive influence, not only what the algorithm shows. Order No. 21 makes over-compliance, induced emotional dependency and emotional manipulation prohibited conduct (Art 8), forbids setting them as a service goal (Art 10), and reaches the platform layer through the app store's verification duty (Art 25). The DSA/DMA frame reaches illegal content, systemic risk and contestability — the provider's influence on an individual user's feelings is not its object. — A (the China text) / C (the comparison)

3. What it means in practice

4. Limits and unverified ⚠

5. Official sources